Abstract
Introduction
A recent High Court case in Ireland by the Irish Hotels Federation against the system of Joint Labour Committees (JLCs) has brought renewed attention to minimum wage setting. Joint Labour Committees consist of trade union and employer representatives and independent members. They set legally binding minimum pay and conditions for low paid workers in some sectors and exist in addition to the National Minimum Wage (NMW). They are part of the contemporary Irish industrial relations regulatory framework and have the same origins as the UK Wages Councils system. Unlike the Wages Councils, which were abolished in 1993 2 , Irish JLCs have persisted. This paper seeks to examine why has the JLC system been retained? In addition, based on a survey of JLC members, we examine the relevance of the JLC system particularly in context of a NMW and the prospects for the retention of JLCs in the future. We conclude that the growth in service employment, the role of Irish social partnership, the Irish party political set-up and the views of employer bodies are seen as the key factors which insulated the JLC system from any serious challenge until recently. We find that trade union representatives on the JLCs support the retention of the system.
While a majority of employer representatives on JLCs believe they are unnecessary and irrelevant, there is less consensus amongst them than trade unions. While employer organisations have in recent years sought the abolition of JLCs, they have engaged with government and trade unions through the social partnership process to achieve changes to the procedures JLCs use to set minimum pay and conditions, rather than pushing for abolition of the JLC system. Until 2000, the JLC system had been the only statutory minimum wage system in Ireland but, as part of the 1997 general election campaign, the small neo-liberal Progressive Democrat party proposed the introduction of a national minimum wage.
This proposal was included in the programme for government, after the Progressive Democrats and Ireland's largest party, Fianna Fáil, were successful in that election.
The resulting coalition Government quickly acted to set up a National Minimum Wage Commission to study the issues around the introduction of a NMW. The Commission (1998:36) considered that "a radical assessment of the role and function of the JLC system will have to take place in the light of the Commission's recommendation to introduce a national minimum wage". However, no such review was undertaken by the Government and, when the NMW was introduced, the JLC system was retained unchanged.
Origins and Trajectories of JLCs and Wages Councils
Both the JLC and the former UK Wages Council systems owe their origin to the In effect, this neoclassical-based view reasserts the primacy of the laws of supply and demand and sees the free market as being preferable to regulation. Starting in 1980 the protection afforded to low paid workers was progressively withdrawn in the UK. Lucas (1991) an estimated an estimated 2.5 million workers had been covered by Wages Councils and protection was removed from them. This action was, in part, reversed with the adoption of a general minimum wage in 1999.
Why have JLCs been retained in Ireland?
The Trades Boards in the UK and Ireland had similar trajectories for many years.
Their names were changed in the 1940s, to Wages Councils and JLCs respectively. 
Growth of the Services Sector
As with the Trades Boards, Irish JLCs were initially concentrated in low paid manufacturing employments characterised by weak trade union organisation.
Examples were brush and broom manufacture, clothing, aerated waters, shirtmaking and women's clothing and millinery. The number of workers covered by JLCs was traditionally a small minority of workers in Ireland, hovering around an estimated 40,000 from the 1950s to the mid 1970s and declining to around 30,000 by the mid1980s ( Figure 1 ). Had antiquated manufacturing employments continued to be the preserve of JLCs, it is probable they would have faced gradual extinction, not from ideological considerations as in the UK, but due to their decreasing relevance.
However, the growth in service sector employment in the 1980s and 1990s changed the situation. From 1988 to 1997 service sector employment grew by 33 percent and with this growth came a number of problems (Wallace et al., 2001) . Research internationally has noted the expansion in service employment as being characterised by increases in both "high road" and "low road" service jobs and Ireland shares in this bimodal division (cf. Dølvik, 2001) . The low road jobs are characterised in Ireland by a high proportion of female employees, part-time employment, lower levels of education, lower availability of in-company training and low trade union density (cf. Hughes et al., 2004; Sexton et al., 2002) . These characteristics, which were present in the Irish service sector expansion, led to the need for regulation and the JLC system, this had risen to 58 percent (see Table 1 ).
In 1984, an estimated 30,000 employees were covered by JLCs (Figure 1 ). By 1989 this figure had risen to almost 65,000 (IRN, 1984; McMahon, 1991) and a decade later coverage had grown to an estimated 162,000 (National Minimum Wage Commission, 1998:29) . This is the last official estimate on the number of workers covered by the JLCs. Using data from a variety of sources, we estimate that there are between 156,700 and 461,600 workers covered by the JLC system 3 . These figures, respectively, represent 9 and 25 percent of total employment in Ireland. The wide disparity in these figures is reflective of the unsatisfactory situation that precise data are not available on the current number of workers covered by the JLC system and no one has responsibility for providing coverage data. 
Figure 1 Estimate of Number of Workers Covered by JLC System, 1926-1998
Source: Harris, 1930; Labour Court, 1954; Ireland, 1962; Ireland, 1976; IRN, 1984; McMahon, 1991; NMWC, 1998 
Political Context
The growth in low road jobs in the services sector provides a structural explanation for the growth in JLC coverage; however, as the service sector has also expanded in UK, it does not explain the reason for the persistence of the JLC system given the abolition of Wages Councils. A major contributor to the retention of the JLC system in Ireland has been the difference in the political framework in both countries. Wages
Councils were rescinded and abolished during an era of Conservative party governments, which had a particularly strong neo-liberal ideology. This neo-liberal influence, which has not been unique to the UK, has led to varying degrees of dilution of employment regulation since the 1970s (cf. Farber and Western, 2002; Frege and Kelly, 2003; Kitson et al., 2000; O'Brien, 2000; Towers, 1989) . In contrast, neoliberal political opposition to labour market regulation in Ireland has been muted and, in relation to JLCs, has been largely absent. The lack of political opposition to labour market regulation in Ireland can be ascribed to the make-up of the Irish multi-party political system. Harney, when announcing the establishment of the National Minimum Wage Commission in 1997, stated "the Government is determined to stamp out exploitation of workers -that has no place in the Irish workplace…" (Sheehan, 1997:14) .
Subsequently she said that the NMW was a key priority for the Government so that those sectors of the labour force on low pay, especially women and young people, 
Employer Attitudes
The third major factor favouring the retention of JLCs has been the attitude of employer organisations. For much of the life of JLCs, employers adopted a generally benign attitude to them, with expressions of dissatisfaction generally centred on operational issues. In fact, at various times when a national minimum wage was mooted, employers opposed its introduction and pointed to the JLCs as meeting the needs for protection of vulnerable workers. This approach is most notable in the submissions made by employer bodies to the National Minimum Wage Commission.
The main Irish employer organisation, the Irish Business and Employer Confederation (IBEC), opposed the introduction of a national minimum wage and claimed that the JLC system had proved its worth (NMWC, 1998; Sheehan, 1998) . The Irish Small and Medium Sized Enterprises (ISME) -a body generally opposed to regulation and national partnership agreements -opted for the retention of the JLC system which could "review sector by sector and establish minimum terms of conditions appropriate to each" (Yeates, 1997:17) . Smaller sectoral employer bodies echoed this approach.
The Irish Retail Newsagents Association argued that the JLC system had "ensured acceptable statutory wage rates by negotiation between employee and employer representatives" (NMWC, 1998:35) . The Irish Hotels Federation suggested that the JLC system was "the most appropriate" system for setting minimum wages and suggested its extension, if needed (NMWC, 1998:35) .
Thus far, we have identified the growth of the services sector, the particular political There are 164 JLC members, of which 106 (76 employer members, 67 worker members and 21 independent members) responded to the questionnaire, giving a 5 The Irish branch of the TGWU was the ATGWU, it is now part of Unite. 6 The Labour Relations Commission is a State dispute resolution body. Its primary service is conciliation and this is staffed by Industrial Relations Officers.
response rate of 65 percent. Over two-thirds of all employer members responded (68%), 60 percent of all worker members responded and 67 percent of independent members responded. Attitudinal questions were asked on the necessity and relevance of JLCs, the reasons for members' opinions and their views on the future of JLCs.
Perceived Necessity and Relevance of JLCs
Two thirds of respondents considered that JLCs were still necessary, in addition to the NMW, while a third thought that they were not necessary ( Table 2 ). The overwhelming majority of trade union and independent members believed JLCs were necessary. Unsurprisingly, employer members were most likely to hold the view that JLCs were no longer necessary; however, there was not a consensus amongst them. A substantial minority of one-third of employer respondents believed JLCs were necessary. To ascertain the reasons for these employers' view that JLCs are necessary, respondents were provided with a Likert scale. The reasons with the strongest employer support were that 'JLCs are necessary because they tailor minimum pay and conditions to the specific industry/employment covered' (33% of employers) and that 'JLCs are necessary because they try to prevent employer undercutting' (33% of employers) -a reason reminiscent of Winston Churchill's comments. Other well supported reasons were that 'JLCs provide a negotiating forum for generally nonunionised workers' (27% of employers); that 'JLCs set more minimum conditions of employment than provided in employment legislation' (25% of employers) and that 'JLCs help workers out of low pay' (25% of employers). There is a difference in conception between whether JLCs are necessary and whether they are relevant. In general, the difference in views on the necessity and relevance of JLCs between employer respondents and others was retained. Interestingly, a higher percentage of trade union members believed JLCs were irrelevant compared to the percentage that considered them unnecessary (Tables 2 and 3 ). These results, while informed by the experience of the JLC members, are subjective and do not give a view of the actual impact of JLCs on pay and terms and conditions of employment
The next section analyses the difference between JLC rates of pay and the NMW. We also examine the minimum conditions of employment set by JLCs. 
Minimum Rates of Pay
In order to examine the actual impact of JLC regulation, we compared the difference between a sample of JLC minimum rates of pay and NMW rates between April 2000
and December 2008 (Table 4) . The difference between the NMW and the JLC rates
gives an indication of the order of magnitude of the impact. Thirty-four percent of rates were between 5% and 10% above the NMW, eleven percent were between 10%
and 15% and thirteen percent were in excess of 15% above the NMW (Table 4 ). It can be seen from the differences between the respective JLC rates and NMW rates analysed, that the JLC system has a greater impact on minimum wage rates in some JLC employments than others. Overall, 70 percent of the JLC rates were less than 10 percent in excess of the NMW and 36 percent were less than five percent over the NMW (Table 5) . Note: Most JLCs set minimum weekly wages so the hourly rate was derived by dividing the weekly minimum by 39 hours. Source: Derived from analysis of EROs
The Minimum Conditions Function
The fact that JLCs set minimum conditions of employment increases the complexity of the debate on JLC relevance beyond merely minimum wage setting. An examination of EROs in operation in 2008 indicates that a significant array of minimum conditions is set by JLCs (Table 6 ). There are three 'types' of minimum conditions in EROs. The first are those which merely duplicate provisions already in existence -for example there already is a legislative obligation on employers to provide written statements of terms of employment to employees (Table 6 ). The second type is those minimum conditions which build on legislative provisions in place, for example, rest breaks. The third type, and the most common type of minimum condition, is those unregulated by legislation. These include overtime pay, service pay and sick pay schemes and are likely to be of substantial concern to 9 Two sets of comparisons were undertaken for one NMW rate (€6.35). This is because a substantial number of JLCs increased their rates in 2003 during the term of the €6.35 NMW. 10 13 JLC rates analysed were below the NMW of €7.65. This is because NMW increases often do not occur at the same time as JLC rate increases. A number of JLCs had not agreed a new ERO in time before the NMW was increased but did so shortly after.
employees (Table 6 ). An additional advantage of JLCs, as noted earlier, is that the minimum conditions can be tailored to the particular industry covered; something which Government-set legislation is unable to do. For example, the Security JLC provides a benefit to those workers who are attacked in the course of their work. The number and range of minimum conditions established by different JLCs varies significantly. For instance, the Law Clerks ERO has only three minimum conditions of employment, while the Contract Cleaning ERO (excluding Dublin) have 16 minimum conditions. The reason for the variation appears, with some exceptions, to be closely related to the age of the JLC. The general tendency is that newer JLCs have more conditions set by them than older ones (Figure 2 ). These newer JLCs also cover the expanding services sector and therefore the greatest proportion of workers covered by EROs. Taken together, both the number and variety of additional conditions set by JLCs and their customised nature indicates that there is a significant supplementary function fulfilled by JLCs which is not met by legislation.
Figure 2 Average Number of Conditions of Employment by Age of JLCs, 2008
Source: Derived from EROs
Views on the Future of JLCs: Survey Responses
Three quarters of survey respondents indicated that the JLC system should be retained in some form, while a quarter felt it should be abolished. The figure opting for retention is higher than the proportion of respondents who considered JLCs to be necessary. As expected, the vast majority of trade union and independent members believed that the JLC system should be retained in some form. Relatively equal percentages of employer respondents believed the JLC system should be retained or abolished. This is somewhat surprising given that two-thirds of employer respondents had previously indicated that JLCs were not necessary. 
Growing Opposition to JLCs and Social Partnership
Ireland has had a system of national social partnership in place since 1987, in which . Unsurprisingly, IBEC argued in the review that the JLC system should be abolished given the existence of the NMW and employment legislation (see Dobbins, 2005) . However, IBEC also noted that if the system were retained, it wanted to see the introduction of more employer-friendly provisions such as inability-to-pay claims. As expected, the ICTU argued for JLCs' retention and believed "there is a zone where JLCs are effective; they are above minimum rates and they are below unionised rates…. The whole collective nature of the JLC is a very good way for collectively vindicating worker rights" (Dobbins, 2005) . Of particular significance though was the fact that State bodies had expressed their support for JLCs in the review. The Labour Court stated that "JLCs provide protection in areas that workers wouldn't otherwise have, such as overtime, shift allowances, pensions, sick pay. The National Minimum
Wage and legislation has partly replaced the JLCs. However, given the 'package' of protection they provide on other issues, it is difficult to see them being replaced in the short run". (Dobbins, 2005) In addition, the Labour Court noted that "even where [JLC rates] are just 10 or 15 cents above the NMW level, workers would expect to retain that. In the security industry rates are 10%-20% higher" (Dobbins, 2005) . represented if JLCs were discontinued?" (Dobbins, 2005) .
The review concluded that the JLC system should be retained based on a strong majority view amongst interested stakeholders but that reforms should be introduced to allow for mergers and the abolition of older JLCs which were no longer relevant.
Events outside the JLC system also decreased any possibility that it would be Court, the employers' counsel argued that the process of setting the ERO was unfair because the chairman had not informed the Labour Court of the employers' economic report on rising labour costs in the hotel sector.
In the event, the case was settled out of court. The Labour Court and the Hotels JLC paid the costs of the employer side and conceded that the correct procedures had not been followed regarding the Hotels ERO in question and it was quashed. Higgins (2008c) reports that a deal made between ICTU and IBEC on JLC reform could have addressed some of the Irish Hotels' Federation concerns prior to the settlement of the High Court case. An agreement was made on the sequencing of pay rises -that JLC pay increases would be applied before NMW increases. In return, employers agreed to a mechanism to review an ERO if there was a delay in introducing it. An ERO, which was not introduced to coincide with the ending of a previous one, had long been a source of frustration for trade unions because it meant that new wage increases to employees were delayed. In addition to the ICTU/IBEC deal, the Government quickly moved to ensure the difficulties identified as part of the out-of-court settlement would be addressed. The Minister for Enterprise and Employment, Micheál Martin, said he was "not impressed" with the legal challenge and that "the Government will take whatever legislative steps are necessary to protect the existing legal mechanism …" (Sheehan, 2008) . A new national partnership agreement was Federation temporarily threw the system into a state of uncertainty. Higgins (2008c) notes that the settlement was a "clever tactical retreat" by the Labour Court and JLC given that the constitutional issue "could have seriously undermined whole chunks of the employment rights machinery of the State if it had been upheld by the High Court". Since the settlement, the Irish Hotels Federation has returned to the Hotels JLC to set another ERO. Its chief executive, John Power, said: "Our hope is that the Hotels JLC procedures will result in an enlightened and transparent process as a result of the significant outcome today" (Higgins, 2008c) . These comments, the comments made by IBEC in the review of JLCs, the deal between the ICTU and IBEC and the provisions of the most recent national partnership agreement suggest that the employers' real interest was not to abolish the JLC system but to ensure that JLCs took greater cognisance of employer concerns regarding procedural issues. Following the High Court case, the Minister for Enterprise, Trade and Employment provided reassurance to trade unions by commenting "we will certainly be at one with the trade union side in terms of making sure that this particular edifice is shored up in whatever way it takes…. We believe in common basic standards and will do whatever we have to" (Wall, 2008) . The support of the Government for JLCs and importantly employer bodies to retain and strengthen JLCs again demonstrates the difference in political landscapes between Ireland and the UK.
Despite the political support for the JLC system, the possibility remains that any individual employer could take another case on constitutional principles and this could strike down the JLC system, irrespective of what the employers and unions agree. Paradoxically, the greater enforcement of EROs arising out of the strengthening of the labour inspectorate has led some employers to complain that the rates set by the JLCs do not match the new commercial realities. For instance, O'Brien's Sandwich Bars claimed it is being forced to cut jobs because of greater enforcement of the Sunday premiums set out in EROs (Higgins, 2008d) . There is therefore continuing controversy at the operation of JLCs. Because the constitutional question of the limitations on the delegation of lawmaking powers was untested in the hotels High Court case, a challenge taken on these grounds cannot be ruled out. If successful, this could prove difficult for the Government and the social partners as any change to the Irish Constitution requires a referendum and governments are frequently reluctant to engage in such a course of action. For the short to medium term, the most recent social partnership agreement and the deal between ICTU and IBEC has satisfied employer concerns but the JLC system's long term future will depend on how the JLCs respond to employers' criticisms in practice.
